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‘Neither the Less VaLorous Nor the Weaker’
Persian military might and the battle of Plataia
introduction1
Not all myths of Greek power and Persian weakness have yet been dispelled. the his-
tory of the eastern empire and her wars with the city-states at her western fringe is still 
sometimes coloured by the assumptions of the victors. While George Cawkwell, in his 
landmark study of the Persian empire’s struggles with Greece in the course of the fifth 
and fourth centuries BC,2 certainly took a great effort to correct the shortcomings of our 
predominantly Greek sources, he still occasionally echoes the statements made in just 
those sources – and this cannot always be entirely justified.
 the point addressed in this article is his description of the battle of Plataia. the 
campaign leading up to this confrontation and the aftermath of the Greek victory are all 
sketched with great insight into Persian strategic concerns and with a healthy amount 
of scepticism towards the writings of herodotos. however, when it comes to the battle 
proper, suddenly Cawkwell’s scepticism seems to take a back seat. the account is no 
more than a reiteration of the well-known claims of herodotos and aischylos that ‘it was 
a match between spear and bow’, a clash of armour versus cloth, which proved ‘the supe-
riority of the Greek hoplite to oriental infantry.’3
 this assumption, however widespread,4 is absurdly simplistic. What follows is an at-
tempt to show that neither the military realities of the day, nor the account of herodotos, 
1 i am greatly indebted to professor a. kuhrt and professor h. van Wees at uCL for their invaluable 
comments on various drafts of this article. any errors or oversights in what follows remain, of course, 
entirely my own.
2 Cawkwell, G., the Greek Wars: the Failure of Persia (New York 2005).
3 Cawkwell, the Greek Wars (as in n. 2), 115, 251; hdt. 9.62.3, 9.63.3; aischylos, Persians 239-240, 
803-822.
4 anderson, J.k., Military theory and Practice in the age of Xenophon (Berkeley/Los angeles 1970), 
7; Farrokh, k., shadows in the Desert: ancient Persia at War (oxford 2007), 82, 84; hanson, V.D., 
the Western Way of War: infantry Battle in Classical Greece (New York 1989), 9-13; hignett, C., 
Xerxes’ invasion of Greece (oxford 1963), 51, 244; holland, t., Persian Fire: the First World em-
pire and the Battle for the West (London 2005), 344; schwartz, a., reinstating the hoplite: arms, 
armour and Phalanx Fighting in archaic and Classical Greece (stuttgart 2009), 276; seibt, G.F., 
Griechische söldner im achaimenidenreich (Bonn 1977), 15, 51, 123; sekunda, N., the Persian 
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insofar as it is reliable, support the notion that technological differences between Greek 
and Persian soldiers proved decisive at Plataia. Many other factors played a part in secur-
ing the Greek victory – and with it, the Greek reputation for military superiority, which 
led to the emergence of a massive mercenary market in the century and a half to come.
Descriptions of the Battle
Given the central role played by the Persian Wars in the history and self-image of the 
Greeks, it is no surprise that references to its climactic and decisive battle exist in several 
extant sources. these go back to the time of the struggle itself. aischylos was a contem-
porary athenian and may in fact have fought at Plataia, as he certainly did at Marathon. 
Yet he only states very generally that the Greeks fought with spears rather than bows, and 
his remark about Plataia merely stresses the crucial contribution of the Lakedaimonians – 
the metaphorical ‘Dorian spear’ – in securing victory. Despite his personal involvement in 
the events, he does not actually offer much that could help us understand the battle proper.
 For this purpose there are three narrative accounts of the battle to turn to.5 the earli-
est and by far the most elaborate of these can be found in herodotos. Needless to say, this 
source is problematic; herodotos was primarily concerned with writing a good story, was 
probably influenced by the biases of his sources and his athenian surroundings at the time 
of writing, and described many things in detail that he could not possibly have known 
about.6 Yet for the battle of Plataia he offers the greatest amount of information, and he is 
the only one who may conceivably have used eyewitness reports. herodotos provides the 
general framework of events, the catalogue of troops and an almost day-to-day account 
of the course of the battle. 7 
 the other two sources are much less useful. Both Diodoros and Plutarch appear to 
have done little more than summarise the story presented by herodotos. Diodoros, more-
army 560-330 BC (oxford 1992), 25. the above is merely a selection. the hellenocentric view 
of hanson is completely accepted by John keegan, one of the most influential of modern military 
historians. it is perhaps for this reason that the theory ascribing the Greek victory against Persia 
to technological superiority combined with the tactic of the reckless charge has gained such wide 
currency: keegan, J., a history of Warfare (London 2004 [hutchinson, 1993]), 253-255.
5 in chronological order: hdt. 9.19-70; Diod. 11.30-32; Plut. ar. 14-19.
6 these points of criticism are almost guaranteed to be discussed in any work citing herodotos; for 
a recent summary applied to the relevant part of the work, see Flower, M.a./J. Marincola (eds.), 
herodotus: histories book iX (Cambridge 2002).
7 Lazenby notes the difficulty of using herodotos, but defends the use of his account on the basis that 
there is little else to work with: Lazenby, J.F., the Defence of Greece 490-479 B.C. (Warminster 
1993), 5-17. Flower and Marincola ([as in n. 6], 20-21) contend that it is better to rely on herodotos 
than to attempt to reconstruct an underlying ‘true’ history with the help of much later and even more 
doubtful sources.
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over, seems to have dropped some essential parts of the narrative;8 Mardonios’ army also 
inexplicably loses and then gains several hundred thousand men in the course of the text.9 
overall, his version appears to be the least comprehensive and reliable; it should be used 
with extreme caution, if at all.10 Plutarch’s account is only somewhat more complete 
and clearly suffers from the author’s understandable but excessive focus on the role of 
his subject aristides. however, it does have some merits worth considering, as various 
authors have pointed out.11 Most importantly, he fleshes out some aspects of the military 
side of herodotos’ description – the role of the athenian archers, Pausanias’ response 
to the Persian assault, and the death of Mardonios. these will be noted as they become 
relevant below.
  Generally speaking, then, the following analysis of the battle of Plataia will be based 
on herodotos, with only occasional use of the other accounts where they provide items of 
interest. But this is not merely a matter of making do with an imperfect source. herodotos 
appears to us as the origin of the claim that Greek weaponry won the day at Plataia; it is 
his description, with its caveats and contradictions, that must take centre stage here.
arms and armour of the Persians
in order to do justice to the events at Plataia it will be worthwhile first to examine the is-
sue of the war gear itself. herodotos laid the foundations of a long scholarly tradition of 
putting the blame for the final Persian defeat on their inability to fight effectively at close 
quarters. But this contradicts what we know of Persian combat equipment from every 
source we have – including herodotos himself. how much should we really make of his 
statements on Persian arms, his claim that ‘what hurt them the most was that their outfits 
lacked armour’?12
 the wealthy Persian nobles who fought as cavalry certainly went into battle wearing 
heavy protective gear.13 herodotos’ tale of the death of Masistios suggests that the armour 
worn by prominent Persians could in some cases be so elaborate and comprehensive that 
 8 For instance, the athenian archers are missing in his account of the first Persian cavalry attack: 
compare hdt. 9.19-22 and Diod. 11.30.2-4. Later on, Diodoros seems to skip several days and ne-
glects to mention the Greek retreat from their position in the plain: compare hdt. 9.50-56 and Diod. 
11.30.5-6. see also n.59 and n.62 below. 
 9 Diodoros estimates its size as more than four hundred thousand at 11.19.6; it drops to more than two 
hundred thousand at 11.28.4, and then rises again to about half a million at 11.30.1.
10 Lazenby calls his description of the battle ‘very confused’: Defence (as in n.7), 7.
11 Flower/Marincola (as in n. 6), 32-34; Wallace, P.W., ‘the Final Battle at Plataia’, hesperia supple-
ment 19 (Princeton 1982), 186 n.8, 188.
12 hdt. 9.63.2; in this passage he claims they fought ‘like naked men (gymnetes) against hoplites’, after 
referring to them as ‘unequipped’ (anoploi) at 9.62.3.
13 Xen. An. 1.8.6; Briant, P., histoire de l’empire Perse: de Cyrus à alexandre (Paris 1996), 553; Far-
rokh, shadows (as in n. 4), 77; head, D., the achaemenid Persian army (stockport 1992), 31.
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Greek hoplites were at a loss trying to pierce it at all.14 of course, armour of such quality 
was an exception, and would not have been seen among the rank and file; but it must at 
least be accepted that Mardonios and his bodyguard would have entered the field well-
protected. Mardonios’ own death, crucial as it was for the course of the battle, should not 
be blamed on a lack of equipment.
 as for the infantry, herodotos himself describes their gear in rather straightforward 
terms.15 the immortals, he says, wear cuirasses made of iron scales and carry gerrha, 
large wicker shields. the Medes in the army have a similar outfit, and troops from certain 
regions wear helmets for additional protection. Moreover, the quality of Persian armour 
left nothing to be desired – it may even be argued that a cuirass of iron scales would of-
fer both better protection and greater mobility than the bronze bell cuirasses that Greek 
hoplites were famously equipped with.16 as for their shields, these were ‘of great light-
ness, yet of great resilience and rigidity’17; perhaps not as tough as the Greek aspis, but 
certainly not so flimsy as to leave the Persian infantryman essentially unprotected.
 the real question, then, is not whether Persian soldiers wore armour, but why hero-
dotos insists they fought ‘like naked men’ in blatant disregard of his own words. some 
scholars have tried to explain his statement by pointing out that the iron cuirasses men-
tioned would realistically have been worn only by a minority of the troops.18 if the greater 
part of the Persian force did not wear armour, it stands to reason that they could still be 
termed ‘unequipped’ compared to the heavily armoured hoplite array. indeed it would 
seem reasonable not to overestimate the number of Persians wearing expensive suits of 
iron armour. however, this explanation is based on the assumption that Greek hoplites 
uniformly entered the field wearing the full hoplite panoply – helmet, cuirass, greaves and 
all. in reality, the number of hoplites thus equipped in the archaic period probably did not 
exceed one in ten.19 this figure matches the ratio of scaled cuirass-wearing troops among 
the immortals as estimated by head.20 there is no reason, then, to assume that the Greeks 
had an advantage in the field due to ‘tough individual armour’;21 the argument that the fin-
14 hdt. 9.22.2-3; the Greeks finally managed to kill the pinned Masistios by stabbing him in the eye.
15 hdt. 7.61.1-3; Farrokh, shadows (as in n. 4), 76-77; head, Persian army (as in n. 13), 27, 29, plate 
2; khorasani, M. M., arms and armour from iran: the Bronze age to the end of the Qaiar Period 
(tübingen 2006), 267-268, 275-276; Lazenby, Defence (as in n. 7), 23; sekunda, Persian army (as 
in n. 4), 15-18; Wiesehöfer, J., Das antike Persien von 550 v. Chr. bis 650 n. Chr. (Munich 1994), 
136-137.
16 Bittner, s., tracht und Bewaffnung des persischen heeres zur Zeit der achaimeniden (Munich 1985), 
166-170; khorasani, arms and armour (as in n. 12), 275-276; Lazenby, Defence (as in n. 7), 23.
17 sekunda, Persian army (as in n. 4), 16-17.
18 hignett, invasion (as in n. 4), 43-45; Lazenby, Defence (as in n. 7), 23. scaled cuirasses have been 
excavated in large numbers at Persepolis, but there is almost no trace of them in the Greek archaeo-
logical record, suggesting that few were captured from the invading army: Miller, M.C., athens and 
Persia in the Fifth Century BC: a study in Cultural receptivity (Cambridge 1997), 48-49.
19 Van Wees, h., Greek Warfare: Myths and realities (London 2004), 50, n. 10.
20 head, Persian army (as in n. 13), 27. 
21 Farrokh, shadows (as in n. 4), 82, 84; see also Flower/Marincola (as in n. 6), 27, 216-217; holland, 
Persian Fire (as in n. 4), 353; sekunda, Persian army (as in n. 4), 25.
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est equipment would only have been available to the wealthy few applies to both sides. it 
will not do to dismiss herodotos’ mention of Persian armour on these grounds. the only 
kind of body armour that the Persians lacked was greaves – surely no fatal oversight, as 
these were entirely optional for the Greeks as well.22
 so what was the real difference between Greek and Persian war gear? herodotos 
stresses that the Persians were handicapped in close-quarter fighting because their spears 
were shorter than those wielded by the Greeks,23 but their actual length cannot be recon-
structed with such categorical certainty. the length of Greek and Persian spears was not 
fixed. Both types appear to have ranged from about one hundred and eighty centimetres 
to in excess of two meters in length; the lack of uniformity forbids any generalisation 
on the matter.24 Moreover, herodotos’ contention that their spears gave the Greeks an 
advantage in battle may to some extent be an anachronism. the doru did not become 
mandatory hoplite equipment until after the Persian Wars. While the Persian immortals 
were certainly all armed with thrusting spears as well as bows, some of the Greek heavy 
infantry would still have been equipped with pairs of light spears that could serve both as 
javelins and for hand-to-hand fighting.25 it was in fact the Persians who were uniformly 
trained and equipped for close combat – such a doctrine had not come to dominate Greek 
minds yet.
 With armour and edged weapons being therefore broadly comparable between the 
two armies, the only element upon which a judgment of ‘anoploi’ could rest is the shield. 
traditional Persian infantry tactics involved a formation ten ranks deep of which only the 
first rank carried gerrha, tower shields meant to be set down as a shield wall. this allowed 
the Persians to act out a sequence of combined arms warfare in which the infantry could 
serve first as archers to weaken the enemy, and then as heavy infantry for the decisive 
clash.26 the Greeks were not so organised; each man carried his own means of protection 
or hid behind another man’s shield if he could. Later sources indicate that the aspis was 
22 Perhaps a third of the hoplites would have worn them, judging by the panoplies dedicated at olympia: 
van Wees, Greek Warfare (as in n. 19), 50. the sheer discomfort of wearing greaves may help us 
understand their scarcity: hanson, Western Way of War (as in n. 4), 76; schwartz, reinstating the 
hoplite (as in n. 4), 76.
23 hdt. 7.211.2.
24 Compare van Wees, Greek Warfare (as in n. 19), 48, and head, Persian army (as in n. 13), 27. 
schwartz, upon stressing the difficulty of properly interpreting images in ancient art, proceeds to 
admit an almost total reliance on such pictorial evidence when it comes to spears, since there are 
obviously no archaeological remains to confirm our estimates: schwartz, reinstating the hoplite (as 
in n. 4), 20-22. since the authors above, analyzing the images known, give quite similar estimates 
for the length of Greek and Persian spears, i do not think it prudent simply to accept herodotos’ 
statements on the matter. see also Flower/Marincola (as in n. 6), 218-219; Lazenby, Defence (as in 
n. 7), 23-24.
25 Van Wees, Greek Warfare (as in n. 19), 50-52.
26 Farrokh, shadows (as in n. 4), 40; head, Persian army (as in n. 13), 22-23; Lazenby, Defence (as in n. 
7), 31-32; sekunda, Persian army (as in n. 4), 16-18. the Persians did possess smaller metal-rimmed 
shields of hardened hide, but these appear to have been used only by palace guards: khorasani, arms 
and armour (as in n. 15), 267-268.
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the truly essential element of hoplite equipment. a soldier without it would indeed be 
seen as ‘unequipped’, one of the ‘naked ones’.27
 in light of this it seems reasonable to accept kuhrt’s suggestion that herodotos called 
the Persians ‘naked’ because they had set down their shields to form the shield wall.28 
this appears to be the only way to make sense of his assessment without contradicting 
his earlier passage on Persian arms. however, if it was indeed herodotos’ intention to say 
that the Persians were helpless against hoplites because they fought without shields, this 
is again anachronistic for the late archaic period, as we shall see – and it hardly serves to 
explain the course of the battle. Firstly, as hunt puts it, ‘the full hoplite panoply was not 
a sine qua non of effective fighting in close formation.’29 the lack of a shield could be 
balanced out by the presence of other, less burdening pieces of protective gear – for in-
stance, an iron cuirass. secondly, it was the Persians who formed a shield wall at Plataia, 
not the Greeks. this wall was the focal point of the initial clash, and even when it fell, the 
trained and well-equipped immortals continued to put up a tenacious resistance until their 
undoubtedly well-armoured leader was killed.30 
 it should come as no surprise that starr, in his survey of ancient Greek discourse on 
why they won the Persian Wars, never once mentions the relative merits of war gear.31 
apart from herodotos and aischylos, nobody seems to have played it up at all. Later 
Greek generals confronted Persians with confidence not because of their equipment but 
because they believed them to be of weaker will and constitution – the exact opposite of 
what herodotos had claimed. Finally, Plutarch was downright offended by herodotos’ 
statement that the Persians fought as gymnetes: ‘is there anything glorious or great left 
to the Greeks from these battles, if the spartans fought with an unarmed enemy?’32 it is 
worth noting that his own account makes no mention of superior Greek equipment except 
as part of a rallying speech. it does not need to in order to explain the course of events. 
to herodotos the Persians may have qualified as naked, but they were fully equipped 
for battle, and all Greeks knew that it took a fierce struggle to bring down the victors of 
thermopylai.
 
27 aristotle, Ath.Pol. 42.4; see also van Wees, Greek Warfare (as in n. 19), 48.
28 kuhrt, a., the Persian empire: a Corpus of sources from the achaemenid Period (abingdon 2007), 
282.
29 hunt, P., ‘helots at the Battle of Plataea’, historia 46 (1997), 140.
30 hdt. 9.62-63. similar Persian tactics again inflicted great losses on the Greeks at Mykale: hdt. 
9.102-103.2.
31 starr, C.G., ‘Why did the Greeks defeat the Persians?’, starr, C.G. (a. Ferrill/t. kelly, eds.), essays 
on ancient history: a selection of articles and reviews (Leiden 1979), 193-204. there is no mention 
of the issue in Jung’s recent analysis of Greek remembrance of the battle: Jung, M., Marathon und 
Plataia: zwei Persenschlachten als “lieux de mémoire” im antiken Griechenland (Göttingen 2006), 
225-297, 386-397.
32 Plut. On the Malice of Herodotos, 43.3-4 (Mor. 874a).
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Military Practice in the age of Mardonios
to give some idea of how the battle was fought, it must be established, not simply how 
the two armies that met at Plataia were differently equipped, but how they were forced by 
their tactical nature to respond to one another. the myth of strong Greek hoplite versus 
weak Persian foot archer produces ubiquitous white noise on this subject and it will be 
useful to attempt to filter it out.
 on an individual level, Classical Greek authors famously depict the Persians as ef-
feminate and weak33 - a mass of untrained meat to be fed to the grinder.34 Yet herodotos 
explicitly states that the Persian foot at Plataia lacked neither strength nor courage.35 in 
reality, Greek commanders of the early fifth century knew better than to underestimate 
Persian soldiers. to date, no less than five pitched battles involving some number of 
hoplites and Persian infantry had been won by the latter.36 it is widely accepted that the 
Greeks took confidence from their victory at Marathon, but this was the only time they 
had ever managed to defeat a Persian force, and it must be remembered that even on that 
occasion the Persian elite still managed to shatter the centre of the Greek line. the Per-
sians would have seen no reason at all to consider themselves incapable of dealing with 
hoplites. Mardonios’ army was built around a core of professional soldiers who, unlike the 
Greeks, were quite probably trained and certainly battle-hardened; he had every reason 
to be confident of their abilities.37 indeed, not long before the clash at Plataia, Mardonios 
brashly dared the spartans to engage in a kind of Battle of the Champions, in which his 
immortals would face them on even terms. the spartans, however, refused to leave the 
safety of the Greek host.38 this shows on the one hand that the Persian commander was 
not intimidated by Greek prowess in close combat, while on the other hand the spartans 
33 For instance at Xen. Ag. 1.28 and by unfavourable comparison to Greeks at Xen. An. 1.7.3.
34 hanson, Western Way of War (as in n. 4), 13.
35 they were ‘neither the less valorous nor the weaker’: hdt. 9.62.3. Later on (at 9.71.1) herodotos 
stresses that ‘among the barbarians those who fought the best were the Persian infantry’.
36 Namely, apart from thermopylai, the battles of Pelousion (525 BC), ephesos (498 BC), the river 
Marsyas (497 BC) and Labraunda (497 BC): Lazenby, Defence (as in n. 7), 32-33, 43-44. Flower 
and Marincola ([as in n. 6], 191-192) believe there may be truth to herodotos’ statement (at 9.46.1) 
that Pausanias feared the Persians; the spartans had only faced them once, and they had been utterly 
destroyed. herodotos himself (7.211) interprets thermopylai as proof of the strength of the hoplite, 
but it is undeniable that the Greeks were outmaneuvered and defeated. there is no sign in the later 
narrative that the confidence of Persian infantry was shaken by the clash (though Xerxes is said to 
have hidden Persian bodies from his sailors when they came to see the battlefield: 8.24-25) . see 
also below, n. 64.
37 hdt. 8.100.2-4; Lazenby, Defence (as in n. 7), 43-44. on this topic hignett (invasion (as in n. 4), 
335) follows herodotos’ claim that the Persians, rather than the Greeks, were lacking in ‘military 
skill’ – an odd statement, considering that the spartans were the only professional soldiers in the 
Greek host, and none of them had seen battle.
38 hdt. 9.48; this will be discussed in more detail below and at n. 66.
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were not confident enough of their individual superiority to take on the cream of the Per-
sian army in a fair engagement. 
 the combat equipment and battlefield function of the Persian immortals has already 
been broadly sketched above. While most of them were primarily armed with bows, all 
were fully equipped and capable of fighting hand-to-hand; the stereotypical image of 
the unprotected foot archer does not seem to be supported much by the evidence. of the 
Greek hoplite something similar may be said. it would do no justice to our sources to as-
sume that all Greeks at Plataia fought as heavily armoured spearmen. as we have seen, 
the famed ‘men of bronze’ were the exception rather than the rule; most hoplites would 
have been rather more modestly equipped. evidence from vase paintings and the like fur-
ther indicates that arming oneself with one’s weapon of choice was still very much a pos-
sibility, and not even the characteristic aspis or hoplite shield was really universal yet.39 
the soldiers herodotos covers with the blanket term of ‘hoplites’ would in truth have 
included many different kinds of fighters – and some of these may even have counted as 
peltasts to later authors.40 their formation would by necessity have been comparatively 
open, and the fighting style of the Greek army as a whole would not fit our idea of how 
Greek infantry typically fought. indeed, this is exactly the impression given by herodo-
tos’ account.41 it is right not to overstate just how much of a hoplite the average Greek 
infantryman was.
 Man for man, then, the finest Greek fighters of the time realistically would not have 
rated themselves higher than their Persian counterparts at Plataia. as has been touched 
upon in the previous section, the challenge they faced was made all the more daunting 
by the fact that the Persians were wholly superior in terms of infantry organisation and 
tactical ability. spartans aside, the Greek soldiers of the Persian Wars were amateurs; 
they received no training and could perform only the most basic battlefield manoeuvres.42 
their line was not so much a formation of heavy infantry as it was a crowd of warriors. 
the Persian elite, on the other hand, seems to have consisted of specialist heavy infantry 
led by a developed officer hierarchy. their established tactic of thinning out enemy lines 
with arrow fire before overrunning them seemed to guarantee success against a stationary 
opponent with a lack of trained missile units to provide cover.43
39 Van Wees, Greek Warfare (as in n. 19), 50-52.
40 it is arguable that at least in Xenophon’s time there was an undefined grey area between light hoplites 
and peltasts, causing some troops to be counted in different categories at different times: Xen. An. 
1.2.9, 1.7.10.
41 the apparent nature of late archaic hoplite battle will be discussed in the next section.
42 Van Wees, Greek Warfare (as in n. 19), 90; see also Pritchett, W.k., the Greek state at War ii 
(Berkeley/Los angeles 1974), 209-212. save for the unlikely story of the double swapping of flanks 
(hdt. 9.46-47; Plut. Ar. 16.5-6), the maneuvers attempted by the Greeks at Plataia tended to end in 
total confusion. Lazenby’s harsh but realistic judgment of Greek military skill (Defence [as in n. 
7], 14-15, 33, 36-38) seems very much at odds with his description of a coherent Greek phalanx 
practically invulnerable to Persian attacks.
43 Farrokh, shadows (as in n. 4), 40; Lazenby, Defence (as in n. 7), 31-32, 249, 253; sekunda, Persian 
army (as in n. 4), 4-7.
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 these problems were compounded further by the fact that the Persian army also de-
ployed large numbers of cavalry. against these horsemen the hoplites had no defence.44 
While a closed phalanx could potentially hold out indefinitely against shock cavalry as 
long as it maintained cohesion, there was nothing it could do against horsemen armed 
with missiles; the Persian horsemen’s charges took the form of repeated missile attacks 
with jabs at the fringes of an enemy formation, denying enemy infantry a chance to come 
to grips. as attrition mounted and morale fell, the target would eventually disintegrate. 
Not even a closed phalanx had any hope of surviving the onslaught.45 as the prelude to 
Plataia makes clear, the hoplites were entirely at the mercy of the elite Persian horse, 
whether they were drawn up for battle or not.46 Pausanias’ exhausted footsoldiers, forced 
by the threat of the cavalry to march at night and in broken ground, were picked off in 
large numbers by the swarming enemy horse. the mobility of the cavalry further allowed 
the Persians to put them to strategic use by severing the Greek supply lines. our sources 
from later periods leave no room for doubt: the Greeks feared specialist horsemen so 
much that every successful struggle against them, significant or not, tended to be de-
scribed as a great achievement.47 Greek helplessness against cavalry is rightly identified 
by Cawkwell as a potentially war-winning advantage for the Persians48 - meaning that 
every battle the Greeks fought against the Persians hinged on whether they could find a 
way to nullify that advantage. No victory was ever guaranteed through inherent factors; 
hoplite armies were far from invulnerable.
 the presence of cavalry in Mardonios’ army, and the effect this had on the events, 
leads to two important points of criticism against the statement that Plataia proved the su-
periority of one infantry type over another. Firstly, the battles of the Persian Wars were not 
strictly heavy infantry affairs; cavalry opened the battle of Plataia and continued to play 
an important part in its aftermath.49 secondly, if we are to regard the battle as ‘a match 
44 Xen. Ag. 1.23; An. 2.4.6, 2.5.17, 3.1.2, 3.2.18, 3.3.8-9, 3.4.24; Diod. 14.36.3; Plut. Ag. 9.4.
45 hdt. 9.18.1; Flower/Marincola (as in n. 6), 134, 136. hignett (invasion [as in n. 4], 45, 300-301, 
336) and Lazenby (Defence [as in n. 7], 221, 240) maintain that Persian cavalry could not break 
a formed phalanx, but this causes problems in their own arguments. if Persian cavalry was really 
impotent against hoplites in battle formation, it would make no sense that the Greek army retreated 
for fear of them (as hignett accepts: invasion [as in n. 4], 323-237), or that Mardonios could hope 
to force the Greek hand with his cavalry (as Lazenby supposes : Defence [as in n. 7], 221, 232-233). 
in truth, even if we are to imagine a fully developed hoplite phalanx at Plataia, its strength must 
not be overstated – when Mardonios pretends to attack his Greek allies (hdt. 9.17-18) his cavalry 
swiftly surrounds them, after which the hoplites see no options left but to prepare to die where they 
stand.
46 hdt. 9.17-18, 21.3, 23.2, 49-50, 56.
47 hdt. 9.25.1; for later examples, see Xen. An. 3.4.4-5; Ag. 1.31-32 (= Hell. 3.4.23-24), 2.5; Plut. Ag. 
16.5. see also Hell.Oxy. (ed. P. Mackechnie/s.J. kern [Warminster 1988]), 11.4-6, in which ambush 
tactics are employed against enemy cavalry for lack of troops fast enough to overtake them.
48 Cawkwell, the Greek Wars (as in n. 2), 115. the author plausibly argues (ibid., 88-89) that the bat-
tle of Marathon was in fact a surprise attack on a withdrawing enemy; the Greeks refused to engage 
until they were sure the enemy cavalry would play no part in the fighting. 
49 hdt. 9.59, 66-69.
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between spear and bow’, then for the longest time it seemed as though the bow was the 
superior weapon. armed with bows and javelins the Persian horsemen could easily avoid 
the spears of the Greek infantry while inflicting massive casualties upon them. Likewise, 
the Persian infantry, when they entered the fray, immediately caused great harm to the 
spartans, helpless as these were for lack of long-ranged weapons of their own.50 the Per-
sians also cleverly used the bow as a form of area control, denying the Greeks access to 
fresh water by keeping the bank of the asopos within bowshot.51
 had the Greek army consisted exclusively of hoplites, it might eventually have suc-
cumbed to the endless barrage of missile fire brought down on it by the Persians. But this 
was certainly not the case at Plataia. Despite the disdain reserved for them in thucydides 
and others,52 light infantry armed with missile weapons certainly had their own place in 
Greek warfare; according to herodotos they outnumbered the hoplites almost two to one 
at Plataia.53 sadly the account does not allow us to reconstruct any part of their actions 
during the battle, but this must not lead us to assume that they did not act. More to the 
point, there was no homogenous hoplite phalanx during the Persian Wars.54 it was not just 
the hoplite body itself that was varied; in the late archaic period the separation between 
light and heavy infantry was not yet absolute, meaning that the Greek phalanx during the 
battle of Plataia was in fact to some extent a mixed formation in which missile troops 
sought protection behind the shields of the hoplites. herodotos’ mention of helot casual-
ties both at Plataia and earlier at thermopylai testifies to this.55 Whatever the form this 
formation would take in practice,56 such a phalanx would not have been entirely helpless 
against enemy light troops.
 Furthermore, Pausanias himself seems to have been well aware of the weaknesses 
of his heavy infantry and the advantage that a few bows could bring. to stop Mardonios’ 
cavalry in the initial skirmishes on the plain of the asopos, the Greeks sent a picked force 
of hoplites plus an athenian corps of archers – and it was these archers who managed to 
50 hdt. 9.61.3; compare thuc. 3.97.3-98.3, 4.34.3; Xen. An. 3.3.7. there is no reason to assume, as 
seibt did (Griechische söldner [as in n. 4], 122, 134), that the bow was ineffectual against hoplites.
51 hdt. 9.50.
52 thuc. 4.126.5, 6.69.2; Van Wees, Greek Warfare (as in n. 19), 61, 64-65.
53 hdt. 9.28-30; the figure is disputed, but it is plain that large numbers of light troops were present at 
the battle. these men should not be casually dismissed as ineffective, as some authors do (for instance 
holland, Persian Fire (as in n. 4), 344 n. 48; Lazenby, Defence (as in n. 4) 228). hunt, ‘helots’ (as 
in n. 29), 130, 141, even argues that the nature of Persian forces would actually make light infantry 
more effective against them than hoplites.
54 Van Wees, Greek Warfare, (as in n. 19), 181-183. he argues that the type of combat herodotos de-
scribes may be qualified as practically homeric, due to hints at an open battle formation and reports 
of the exploits of individual heroes. see also n. 65 below.
55 hdt. 8.25.2, 9.85.1; see also Plut. Ar. 14.3, where the athenian archers are said to ‘mingle’ with the 
hoplites.
56 hunt has suggested an eight-rank phalanx of which only the front rank consisted of hoplites: ‘helots’ 
(as in n. 29), 132-134. however, this is highly improbable; for one thing, the resulting Lakedai-
monian phalanx would be ten to twenty kilometers wide – something rather difficult to image on 
the battlefield of Plataia.
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wound the Persian commander’s horse, turning the skirmish into a pitched battle.57 at the 
start of the battle proper, the spartan wing of the line was charged by the Persians; Pausa-
nias promptly sent a message to his athenian allies saying that, if they could not make it 
to their aid in force, they should at least send their archers.58
 With all this in mind, it is difficult to avoid an overall impression of Greeks forced 
to take desperate measures and rely on troops of inferior status to make up for the fact 
that the Persians were holding all the cards. the invaders had the upper hand in terms of 
tactical speed, range, flexibility, and the ability to cause damage. as amateur soldiers and 
as hoplites, the Greeks were practically helpless against missile fire and horsemen. they 
were unable to do anything about Mardonios’ complete domination of the battlefield. 
even against the Persian heavy infantry alone, they did not feel certain of victory. how 
did these Greeks manage to win the battle of Plataia?
Plataia: the eastern Way of War
it is apparent from the account of herodotos that Mardonios faced a very difficult situ-
ation in 479. he had been left in Greece with the cream of the Persian army, ordered to 
make short work of the remaining Greek resistance; now the Greek land army had finally 
gathered against him in the plain of Boeotia, and his options were limited.
 herodotos claims that the Persian army at Plataia numbered over three hundred 
thousand,59 but it seems reasonable to doubt that figure. Cawkwell points to several indi-
cations in herodotos that ‘Mardonios’ army was not much greater than the Greek hoplite 
array.’60 Most important among these indications is the fact that when the armies face 
each other there is no mention of flank overlap on either side of the Greek line. herodotos 
mentions, of course, that the Persians were drawn up in deeper formation because they 
greatly outnumbered their opponents – but in its context that statement does not make 
sense.61 the passage in question describes the deployment of Mardonios’ army; wishing 
to match his best against the finest of the Greeks, Mardonios positioned his Persians – and 
only his Persians – against the Lakedaimonian hoplites. the Medes and other elements of 
his army were deployed against other Greeks. We know from the earlier passage listing 
Mardonios’ forces that the Persians under his command, cavalry aside, were the immor-
tals, and no one else. hence, going by herodotos’ own figures, Mardonios deployed ten 
thousand Persians against ten thousand Lakedaimonians. how could the Persians then 
find themselves outnumbering their opponents?
57 hdt. 9.22.2; Plut. Ar. 14.1-3.
58 hdt. 9.60.
59 hdt. 8.113, 9.31-32.
60 Cawkwell, the Greek Wars (as in n. 2), 101-103, 249-251; see also Flower/Marincola (as in n. 6), 
163; hignett, invasion (as in n. 4), 354-355, 438.
61 Compare hdt. 8.113.2, 9.28 and 9.31.2-4.
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 in fact, the Persian deployment just cited seems to suggest that the two armies at 
Plataia were more or less evenly matched. if Mardonios did enjoy a numerical advantage, 
it is odd that he chose not to extend his line; the Persians were obviously aware of the ad-
vantages of striking an enemy in the flank or rear.62 Diodoros states that the Greeks chose 
the terrain at Plataia deliberately to prevent being outflanked and to deny the Persians 
the advantage of numbers, but it has been noted that the entirety of his account is rather 
doubtful. in his version the Greeks did battle from a position which herodotos says they 
had been forced to abandon. Persian cavalry had managed to get around them and poison 
their water supply – not greatly impeded, apparently, by the presence of protective geo-
graphical features.63 all evidence points to a Persian willingness and ability to outflank 
their enemies, with a lack of excess troops preventing them from actually doing so. the 
deep formation envisioned by herodotos and Diodoros may be no more than an invention 
serving to explain where, if not in a huge overlapping flank, the Persians had hidden the 
supposed vastness of their army.
 it may be possible to go even further than this. as has been mentioned above, Mar-
donios challenged the spartans at Plataia to an engagement with even numbers, spartan 
hoplite versus Persian immortal. though he was probably very confident of his elite’s 
abilities, it is difficult to believe that he would have preferred a match of this kind. ther-
mopylai had shown that – given the vastly advantageous defensive position the spartans 
had held – the only way the immortals could gain victory was by using their superior 
numbers to surround them.64 of course, this option was not beyond Persian means, and 
the way they dealt with determined enemies in strong positions shows the versatility of 
their forces; both at thermopylai and in the overture to Plataia, they used manoeuvre and 
speed to dislodge their static enemies once direct assault had proven fruitless. But this 
required more than a rough parity of troops. Mardonios would be taking an unreasonable 
risk if he actually gave up the numerical advantage he supposedly had – unless the truth 
was that he feared Greek numbers more than spartan skill. indeed, we find herodotos 
stating repeatedly that the Persians feared the size of the Greek army.65 Concrete evidence 
is lacking, but it may well have been the Persians who were outnumbered at Plataia.66
62 as they famously did at thermopylai: hdt. 7.213-215. the Greek deployment at Marathon, with its 
strong wings and weak centre, seems to have served specifically to deny the Persians this chance: 
hdt. 6.111.4. at kounaxa the Persian king’s only tactical manoeuvre was an attempt to exploit his 
superior numbers by enveloping Cyrus’ left flank: Xen. An. 1.8.23.
63 Compare Diod. 11.30.5-6 and hdt. 9.50, 56.
64 hdt. 7.211. the nature of the terrain at thermopylai made Persian victory through head-on assault 
impossible. Yet, once they found a way to surround the enemy force, spartan resistance was swiftly 
broken, which is why the Persians had no reason to lose confidence in their elite infantry. there is 
an interesting parallel between this battle and the final phase of the fighting on sphakteria some 
fifty-five years later: thuc. 4.35-38.
65 hdt. 9.38.2, 41.1, 41.3, 45.2. Plutarch has it that the Greek army was still growing at this point: Plut. 
Ar. 15.1.
66 Flower and Marincola ([as in n. 6], 193) point out that Mardonios’ ‘empty boasting’ to the spartans 
fits his characterization as rash and impetuous by herodotos, and reject the passage as unhistorical. 
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 this state of affairs, combined with the knowledge that the Greeks could do little or 
nothing against cavalry attacks, prescribed a Persian strategy of protracted war: one in 
which Greek numbers would be gradually depleted and Greek morale gradually worn 
down by constant harassment and denial of water and supplies. initial Greek inactivity in 
the face of this threat could well be explained by their desire to bait the Persians into an 
all-out attack; they had trouble coordinating their massive army and may have hoped that 
a Persian strike across the asopos and into hilly terrain would work to their advantage.67 
their strategy, however, ended up only helping Mardonios, whose horsemen wreaked 
havoc on the Greeks for days. Mardonios appears to have made all the right moves to 
exploit Greek immobility, tactical limitations and inexperience controlling an army as 
vast as the one gathered at Plataia. Yet the Greeks would not be routed. Both sides even-
tually ran out of supplies; it was the Persians who acted upon it.68 Mardonios, faced with 
a stubbornly united enemy, had no choice but to force a decisive engagement. When he 
found that the Greeks had left their camp in seeming flight to a new position, he seized 
his chance.
 his assault landed on a Greek column in serious disarray. Pausanias’ attempted noc-
turnal retreat had ended in chaos as his centre essentially fled the battlefield while his 
right at first refused to move at all.69 Mardonios must have realised that the Greeks’ ap-
parent lack of a coherent defensive line meant a chance to deal with them piecemeal. the 
Persian core of his army directly engaged the spartans while his Greek allies prevented 
the athenians from coming to their aid.70 spartan defence was at first non-existent; they 
took time to obtain favourable omens for battle even as the Persian arrows rained down 
on them. When, at last, the tegeans charged, the spartans found the desired signs and fol-
lowed suit.71
however, they accept that both Xerxes and Mardonios were confident of victory in the campaign of 
479, after the battle of thermopylai (ibid., 29). it seems too easy to dismiss the challenge altogether, 
especially since it was in the interest of both armies at Plataia to try to provoke the other into making 
rash decisions.
67 hignett in particular insists that the Greeks believed they held superior ground: invasion (as in n. 
4), 45, 51, 55, 308-309, 311, 321. however, as discussed above, the passage at Diod. 11.30.6 where 
this is explicitly stated should not be taken at face value.
68 hdt. 9.45, 50; Cawkwell, the Greek Wars, 114-115. the passage in herodotos is often dismissed 
because the context – a secret message from alexander of Macedon – is highly suspect. however, 
somewhat earlier in the narrative (hdt. 9.41) the Persians themselves are also shown worrying about 
their supplies. While there is not much ground for accepting herodotos’ account of a discussion 
among Persian leaders, the size of the armies gathered at Plataia still makes supply problems for 
both sides highly plausible. see also thuc. 6.33.5; Flower/Marincola (as in n. 6), 22. hignett (inva-
sion [as in n. 4], 319-320) suggests a different reason for Mardonios’ eagerness to give battle: the 
Greek victory at salamis and ensuing naval offensive may well have formed a threat to his line of 
communications and retreat.
69 hdt. 9.51-58; Flower/Marincola (as in n. 6), 25, 200-201.
70 hdt. 9.59-61.1, 67. it is worth noting Plutarch’s addition that Pausanias failed to give the signal to 




 the Persians had by this time made the most of their advantage as missile troops. 
true to form, they had set up their wall of shields from behind which the infantry could 
continue to use their bows until the enemy reached it. But the shield wall was more than 
a mere makeshift fortification; it was a sign that the Persians intended to stand and fight 
– which may be why herodotos could find no fault with their courage at this point. they 
never meant to act like the light-armed troops in the famous passages of thucydides and 
Xenophon.72 their spear-armed ranks were deep; they were set to face down a charge. 
the description of hand-to-hand combat at the temple of Demeter, though, seems alto-
gether different from the familiar image of Classical hoplite battle – not to mention the 
charge of ‘ordered squares’ imagined by hanson.73 if the spartan counterattack was a 
sustained phalanx charge, how could the Persian infantry have room to engage them in 
small groups, one or ten men at a time? how could the deeds of lone Greek heroes stand 
out? 
 the probable nature of the phalanx at this time, combined with the words of herodo-
tos, point to the likely assumption that Plataia was not in fact a hoplite battle of the kind 
we know from the Classical age.74 the spartans did not maintain pressure on the Persians 
but apparently formed an almost defensive formation, allowing their enemies to come 
ahead in squads to be defeated. it should come as no surprise that this battle ‘went on for 
a long time’.75 slowly, due to the undoubtedly constant use of missile weapons by the rear 
ranks and the irregular heavy infantry clashes that erupted along the line, both sides were 
worn down – but the Greeks, again, refused to break. the Persian elite gathered around 
Mardonios was certainly far outnumbered locally by the spartans; they killed many of 
their enemies until a rock thrown by a desperate spartan brought Mardonios down.76 
72 thuc. 3.97.3-98.3, 4.32.4, 4.33.2; Xen. An. 3.4.25-27; Xen. Hell. 4.5.15-17.
73 hdt. 9.62; cf. hanson, Western Way of War (as in n. 4), 10; holland, Persian Fire (as in n. 4), 350-
353.  For a reconstruction more in line with the evidence, see van Wees, Greek Warfare (as in n. 
19), 181. it is useful to bear in mind hunt’s remark, cited above (n. 29) that ‘the full hoplite panoply 
was not a sine qua non of effective fighting in close formation’ – a closed phalanx is not a necessary 
precondition to explain the scene described by herodotos. again, we should not assume the existence 
of a homogenous hoplite phalanx at Plataia.
74 herodotos (7.211.2-3) says the spartans used skirmishing tactics and feints at thermopylai, and 
Plato (Laches 191C) claims the same for Plataia, though this is not generally accepted as historical. 
Van Wees (Greek Warfare [as in n. 19], 180) suggests that this is how the still-archaic phalanx of 
the early fifth century may have actually fought.
75 admittedly it is not clear what this phrase actually means – the difficulty of understanding it properly 
is discussed in schwartz, reinstating the hoplite (as in n. 4), 202-205. however, schwartz concedes 
that the words of herodotos apply only to the clash of heavy infantry, and therefore probably do 
imply a protracted struggle.
76 hdt. 9.63; the manner of Mardonios’ death is an addition by Plutarch, which is not at all improbable 
and illustrates the chaotic nature of the clash: Plut. Ar. 19.1.
‘Neither the Less Valorous nor the Weaker’ 15
his death caused the  morale of his bodyguards to plummet beyond repair.77 When they 
routed, the entire Persian army went with them.78
 at this point the battle was not over yet. the athenians still had to dispatch the tena-
cious thebans deployed against them, and the as yet unused Persian cavalry made sure 
the Greeks could not freely pursue the routing enemy army. it is unclear from the narra-
tive what exactly prevented the cavalry from playing a part in the battle proper, but pos-
sibly they were not expected to, having already played their part in the traditional Persian 
sequence of field engagements.79 alternatively, the horsemen may have been held back 
specifically to stamp out any Greek attempt at manoeuvre. this is certainly what they 
did; a reckless detachment of Greeks caught out of formation was promptly wiped out 
by thessalian mounted troops.80 Yet, in the end, the Persians were chased back to their 
fortified camp; after a bitter fight to breach the walls, the camp was taken and the Persian 
army melted away.81 it left behind a valley full of Persian and spartan corpses.82
 there does not appear to be any reason to bring arguments of technology or fighting 
skill into the discussion in order to explain the Greek victory. in short, the Persians did not 
enjoy much of a numerical advantage, or at least not at the critical point; a fixed-sequence 
tactical doctrine, broken ground and fear of enemy numbers kept them from putting their 
cavalry to full use in the clash. they nevertheless fought effectively against the spartans 
until their mounting casualties coupled with the loss of their leader became too much for 
them. the Greeks did not win because some of them may have been better armoured, 
but simply because they managed to outlast their enemies and break their morale – in the 
campaign as a whole as well as during the battle. it was their continued coherence and 
fighting spirit, despite the heavy losses suffered, that made them the last men standing at 
Plataia.83 
77 hdt. 9.63, 65.1; Diod. 11.31.2. the loss of a general is often fatal for an army, as Plutarch warns: 
Plut. Pel. 1.5, 2.4. kounaxa is another example of this phenomenon, as can be glanced from Xen. 
An. 1.9.31. 
78 hdt. 9.68.1. again, armies falling apart when their elite unit routed were common in antiquity, for 
instance at Leuktra (Plut. Pel. 23; Xen. Hell. 6.4.13-14) and at the krimesos (Plut. Tim. 18.4-5).
79 Farrokh, shadows (as in n. 4), 40.
80 hdt. 9.68.2-69.
81 according to herodotos (9.70) they were butchered almost to a man, but Cawkwell supposes that 
they fled to thessaly instead: the Greek Wars (as in n. 2), 115 n. 64.
82 With herodotos’ repeated mention of severe losses suffered by the spartans (9.49, 61.3, 63, 70), 
his own estimate of the total Greek casualties (a mere one hundred and sixty: 9.70.7) is incredible. 
the figure is too low even if it only includes the men lost during the melee with the immortals, as 
Flower and Marincola suggest ([as in n. 6], 140). Plutarch himself already found it ‘astonishing’ 
(Ar. 19.5). however, nothing in the known descriptions of the battle allows us to say with certainty 
whether the figures presented by him (thirteen hundred and sixty: Ar. 19.4) or Diodoros (more than 
ten thousand: 11.33.1) are closer to the truth.
83 the cohesion and high morale of the Greek army is recognized as its great strength at Plataia by 
both hanson (Western Way of War [as in n. 4], 117-120) and van Wees (Greek Warfare [as in n. 19], 
181), yet somehow neither author puts this factor above hoplite equipment in relative importance.
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Conclusion
Many modern accounts of the wars between Greece and Persia still contain traces of the 
dominant bias in the Greek sources we have. even Cawkwell, whose criticism of hero-
dotos is well-reasoned throughout, allowed one such piece of slanted information to slip 
through his net. the battle of Plataia, says herodotos, was won because the Persians had 
no armour; it was a struggle of hoplites against unequipped men. this proved decisively, 
says Cawkwell, that the hoplite was superior to all Persian infantry.
 this is a severe oversimplification of the military realities of the early fifth century 
BC. as we have seen, the veteran Persian immortals did not fear the hoplite, nor did the 
spartans wish to risk an even battle to prove their mettle. in practice, even if Persian 
infantry would technically count as ‘naked’ to herodotos, they were equipped for hand-
to-hand fighting and never easily overcome when they chose to fight. Furthermore, the 
Persians did not rely exclusively on their infantry to win their battles – unlike the Greeks. 
Persian mounted forces were a serious threat to their enemies at Plataia, who could do 
very little about their constant attacks and were forced to dance to their tune even after 
they had overcome Mardonios’ infantry elite. the bow, often derided as useless against 
well-armoured hoplites, appears to have been the bane of the Greeks; their own lack of 
sufficient numbers of archers meant that they were forced to worry about their water 
supply, forced to adapt constantly to Persian initiatives, and forced to charge the Persian 
shield wall or perish.
 the outcome of the battle of Plataia was the result of a combination of logistical, 
tactical and psychological factors. if Mardonios even enjoyed numerical superiority, it 
certainly was not great; his lack of supplies forced him nevertheless to engage the Greek 
army, which so far had suffered greatly from his tactics but refused to quit the field in 
despair. he chose to attack when he found his opponents scattered and confused, manoeu-
vring clumsily to safer ground to escape Mardonios’ cavalry. his archers caused serious 
damage to the main part of their army. even after the spartan counterattack, things still 
seemed to be looking up for the Persians, who had suffered no losses yet; their ten-deep 
formation made them well suited for a grinding match even if they could not outflank the 
enemy. they found a reliable ally in the thebans, who kept the other Greeks from inter-
fering with their struggle.
 however, the Greeks, true to the ideals of their culture,84 did not acknowledge the 
hopelessness of their situation. they fought on against the better judgment of any ra-
tional observer. in the end their persistence paid off; they managed to kill Mardonios and 
the majority of his bodyguard, after which the Persian army’s resolve crumbled. Persian 
power was not yet broken, but the battle had been won.
 Clearly there is no need for debates on the length of spears or the size of shields here. 
the Persians indeed lacked neither strength nor courage; their skill and equipment left 
84 it is telling that herodotos judges the Persian performance at Plataia by saying they ‘had fought no 
fight to the end nor achieved any feat of arms’: hdt. 9.67.3. Plutarch actually praises the spartans 
for stoically enduring Persian arrow fire while they waited for the omens to improve: Plut. Ar. 17.7.
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nothing to be desired. they could count combat experience, speed and mobility among 
the advantages they had over the Greeks. What the Greeks brought in to counter this was 
the first beginning of tactical ingenuity on their part, in the form of the athenian archers, 
but mostly a stubbornly defiant mindset that allowed them to endure relentless punish-
ment without breaking. their morale, despite days of increasing scarcity of supplies, 
harassment by cavalry attacks, lack of drinkable water, night marches and conflicts in the 
high command, did not drop to a critical level. Perhaps this was a feature of the hoplite 
ethic; perhaps it was because the Greeks were fighting for their independence; whatever 
the case, they held out at the temple of Demeter until the Persians could not stand it any-
more.
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